Wednesday, August 05, 2009
Siverand V Texas ~ What a Joke.......Saldano v Texas controls .....dumbass! 299th? I feel sorry for all those people in that court..........
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
LIMITING THE RECORD ON BEHALF OF THE STATE ... THE APPELLANT IS DENIED DUE PROCESS......
Labels: Marshall dissented in Strickland V Washington, SCOTUS, Sleeping Attorney strategy, Sleeping soundly
Saturday, March 15, 2008
U2 deserve each other~ in Hell that is ~Baird and Hubert ki......., first comes........
"the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." Barker, 407 U.S. at 532-33, 92 S.Ct. at 2193-94.
John Hubert you are the Tamperer of governmental documentation records. I hope you do "spend the rest of the summer in the library."
Texas Fair Defense Act
Saturday, March 15, 2008
This is an issue of considerable public importance
Labels: Jusitce, Marshall dissented in Strickland V Washington, SCOTUS, Sleeping Attorney strategy, Sleeping soundly, soundly sleeping strategy
Friday, March 14, 2008
because the record is simply underdeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the failings of trial counsel. Duh!
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 COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG ALEJANDRO RODRIGUEZ MATA, Appellant, v. On appeal from the 257th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas. O P I N I O N Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez and Baird Opinion by Justice Baird Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of murder. The indictment also alleged a prior felony conviction for the purpose of enhancing the range of punishment. A jury convicted appellant of the charged offense. Following appellant’s plea of not true, the jury found the enhancement allegation true and assessed punishment at ninety-nine years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Institutional Division, and a fine of $10,000. We affirm the conviction, but reverse and remand for a new trial on punishment. I. Self Defense and Defense of Third Person. Points of error one, two, and three contend: (a) the trial judge erred in denying appellant’s requested jury instruction on the defense of a third person; (b) the trial judge erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on self defense; and (c) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a charge on self defense. A person is justified in using non-deadly force against another where he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 9.31 (Vernon Supp. 2004). A person is justified in using deadly force against another if: (1) he would be justified in using non-deadly force; (2) a reasonable person in the actor's situation would not have retreated; and, (3) he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.32(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Section 9.33 of the penal code “provides, essentially, that a person is justified in using deadly force to protect a third person when that third person is threatened by circumstances that would entitle the actor to protect himself, and the actor reasonably believes his intervention is immediately necessary.” Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Since appellant used deadly force in the instant case, the issue is whether either appellant or a third person would have been justified in using such force against the decedent. The only fact witness cited in appellant’s brief to support these points of error is Raymond Dean Sanchez. We need only consider his testimony because a defendant is entitled to an instruction on any properly requested defensive issue that is raised by the evidence, even if the evidence is weak, impeached, and not credible. Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Conversely, if the evidence, viewed in a favorable light, does not establish the defensive issue, an instruction is not required. Dyson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Sanchez testified the decedent wanted to purchase some cocaine. Sanchez drove the decedent to the apartment complex where appellant lived, and asked where cocaine could be located. Appellant’s brother, Leo, got into the vehicle with Sanchez and the decedent, and drove to a location where cocaine was subsequently purchased. On the return trip, Leo and the decedent began snorting the cocaine. Upon their arrival, the two began arguing over whether Leo consumed too much of the decedent’s cocaine. After exiting the vehicle, the decedent shoved Leo, and a fight ensued. Sanchez attempted to break up the fight; when his efforts failed, Sanchez went to appellant’s apartment and sought help separating the fighters. Sanchez testified appellant approached the fighters and stabbed the decedent with a screwdriver. According to Sanchez, after the initial push by the decedent, Leo got the better of the decedent and was on top of him during the fight. Leo was still on top of the decedent when appellant arrived, and Leo never asked appellant for help. Moreover, Sanchez was steadfast in his testimony that the decedent was unarmed at all times, and that the decedent did not threaten to kill anyone. For the purpose of our analysis we will assume the initial shove by the decedent constituted unlawful force, and that Leo was entitled to defend himself against that force. However, Sanchez’s testimony is clear that Leo quickly gained the advantage during the fight, and was on top of the unarmed decedent. Consequently, we hold the trial judge did not err in denying appellant’s requested instruction on the defense of a third person, or in failing to instruct the jury on self defense. Furthermore, we hold defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a charge on self defense because counsel cannot be ineffective for not requesting an instruction the trial court could have properly refused. Rodriguez v. State, 899 S.W.2d 658, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Accordingly, the first, second, and third points of error are overruled. II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Points of error four through eleven contend defense counsel was ineffective at the trial of the instant case. The right to the effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed to criminal defendants by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution. The well-known two-prong standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984), is utilized when reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The reviewing court must first decide whether trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Id. If counsel's performance was deficient, the reviewing court must decide whether there is a "reasonable probability" the result of the trial would have been different but for counsel's deficient performance. Id. A reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. Absent both showings, an appellate court cannot conclude the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687; Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Boyd v. State, 811 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The defendant bears the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will be sustained only if they are firmly founded and affirmatively demonstrated in the appellate record. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). When determining the validity of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, any judicial review must be highly deferential to trial counsel and avoid the deleterious effects of hindsight. Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). This deferential review begins with the strong presumption that counsel's actions and decisions were reasonably professional, and were motivated by sound trial strategy. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Appellant has the burden of rebutting this presumption, and generally the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to show that counsel's representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or strategic decision-making as to overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable and professional. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (trial record generally not sufficient to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). There is, however, a recognized exception to this general rule which will be discussed in relation to the tenth point of error.A. The Guilt Phase. 1. The fourth point of error contends defense counsel was ineffective for failing to secure an adverse ruling following his objection to the State’s argument that Sanchez had seen appellant with a knife stabbing the decedent as he lay on the ground. Defense counsel objected, stating the argument was “a mischaracterization of the testimony.” The trial judge responded by stating: “Use your own recollection, ladies and gentlemen, as to what the witness has testified to.” We agree with defense counsel that the argument constituted a misstatement of Sanchez’s testimony. Sanchez categorically stated that he did not see anyone with a knife. The State cites Kinnamon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds, Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), for the proposition that defense counsel may have decided the instruction adequately admonished the jury. While we do not read Kinnamon as necessarily standing for that proposition, the State’s argument does prove that we do not know why defense counsel did not continue objecting until he obtained an adverse ruling. It could well be that counsel thought the instruction from the trial judge was adequate. Because the record is silent on this issue, we are left to speculate about counsel’s actions. This we will not do. The fourth point of error is overruled.
2. The fifth point of error contends defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State calling a witness for the sole purpose of impeaching her. Our law is clear that the State may not call a witness solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness with otherwise inadmissible evidence. Hughes v. State, 4 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The witness at issue, Adriana Mata, appellant’s sister, was a fact witness who had previously provided a written statement that she saw appellant stab the decedent. She had previously testified for the State at Leo’s trial for this same alleged offense. However, when called as a witness in the instant case, Adriana repeatedly stated that she did not remember making a statement or seeing the alleged murder. There is no showing the State called Mata solely for the purpose of impeaching her. Moreover, the information contained in Adriana’s statement which was subsequently introduced to impeach her was substantially testified to by other witnesses. Consequently, we hold there was no violation of the holding in Hughes, supra. Accordingly, the fifth point of error is overruled. 3. The sixth point of error contends defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to an extraneous offense. Specifically, there was no objection to the testimony of Officer Adrian Medrano, who testified that he checked the criminal histories of Leo and appellant when attempting to find an address to locate them. Defense counsel’s failure to object does not constitute ineffective assistance because the mere suggestion of the possibility of an extraneous offense is not sufficient to constitute error. Roach v. State, 586 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), overruled on other grounds, Parker v. State, 985 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The fifth point of error is overruled. 4. The seventh point of error contends defense counsel was ineffective for “not objecting to irrelevant/overly prejudicial matters.” This point of error relates to the testimony of Sonia Garcia, the decedent’s sister, who identified a photograph of the decedent, and provided some background information. Although not specifically mentioned in appellant’s brief, we interpret this point of error as arguing that Garcia’s testimony constituted improper victim impact evidence. Clearly, the State is permitted to provide evidence identifying the decedent in a murder case. This type of testimony constitutes error when presented in an inflammatory and prejudicial manner. See Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826, 829-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). However, the instant case is easily distinguishable from Stahl where the prosecutor deliberately violated an express court order that would have prevented the witness from testifying, and the court found that the prosecutor's conduct was blatant in that he had foreknowledge of the witness's likely emotional outburst. Id. at 831. In this case, appellant does not allege, nor does the record suggest, the existence of prosecutorial misconduct. Further, there was no emotional outburst as in Stahl, but rather a brief identification of the decedent with some general background information. Accordingly, we hold Garcia’s testimony was not prejudicial to appellant. Assuming arguendo the testimony was prejudicial, the testimony of Garcia pales in comparison to that in Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), where the erroneous admission of such evidence was held to be harmless. See id. at 355. Accordingly, the seventh point of error is overruled.
B. The Punishment Phase. The eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh points of error concern the good conduct time and parole instruction included in the punishment charge, and the State’s arguments on those subjects. 1. The Erroneous Instruction. Appellant was convicted of murder, a first degree felony, for which he is required to serve one-half of his actual sentence (or thirty years) without regard for any good conduct time. Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Following such a conviction, the trial judge is required to instruct the jury as prescribed by the code of criminal procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004). In its entirety, that instruction reads: Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, may earn time off the period of incarceration imposed through the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities may award good conduct time to a prisoner who exhibits good behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison authorities may also take away all or part of any good conduct time earned by the prisoner.
See id. (emphasis added). However, the trial judge instructed the jury that appellant would not become eligible for parole “until the actual time served plus any good conduct time earned equals one-half of the sentence imposed or 30 years, which ever is less, without consideration of any good conduct time he may earn.” (emphasis added). Because the italicized portion of the instruction was erroneous, we hold defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object. Accordingly, the first prong of Strickland has been established as it relates to the eighth point of error. 2. The Improper Argument. After the reading of the court’s charge, the State elected to make an opening argument prior to defense counsel. The State began by referring to appellant’s pen packet, and how a final conviction would affect the range of punishment. The State then argued: The other thing that’s important here there is a lot of language regarding your, you know, that he can get good time credit, that there is such a thing as parole. That’s to let you know there is parole in Texas. What it is for the, okay, for you to do is go back and say, Let’s do him. Give him this because he will get out in this amount of time because you don’t know how the parole law will be applied today. They can change those laws in two years from now, but it is to let you know that they do exist and you may consider the existence of them, the fact that he may at some point be eligible for parole in considering the amount of time you think is appropriate in this case.
For example, when you look at the pen packet you can see that he was sentenced and the date he was sentenced. And the date you’ll see it was a sentence for five years for burglary of a habitation, and possession of a prohibited weapon, and date of that sentence . . . And after that he was sent to prison for a period of five years on . . . January of 1998. And so you know he was sentenced to a period of five years in 1998, and this offense was committed on January 1st of the year 2001, less than five years later. So you know parole does exist in reality. And so that will help you understand those issues. (Emphasis added). Defense counsel then presented her argument which did not mention good conduct time or parole. The State’s argument was improper in several respects. First, the prosecutor stated a person convicted of murder “can get good time credit.” As discussed in the preceding section, this argument is a misstatement of the law; a person convicted of murder is required to serve one-half of his actual sentence (or thirty years) without regard for any good conduct time. Luquis, 72 S.W.3d at 359. Even if the trial judge had accurately instructed the jury, this argument would have been improper because the statutory instruction specifically prohibits the consideration of good conduct time in a particular case: “[Y]ou are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a). Second, the State specifically asked the jury to apply the law of parole to appellant by stating: “What it is for the, okay, for you to do is go back and say, Let’s do him. Give him this because he will get out in this amount of time because you don’t know how the parole law will be applied today,” and asking the jury to consider parole “in considering the amount of time you think is appropriate in this case.” This argument violates the express language of the statutory instruction: “You are not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.” Id. Third, subsection (d) of article 37.07, section 4 provides: “This section does not permit the introduction of evidence on the operation of parole and good conduct time laws.” Id., § 4(d). The State circumvented this mandatory statute by specifically referring the jury to the pen packet and arguing “And so you know he was sentenced to a period of five years in 1998, and this offense was committed on January 1st of the year 2001, less than five years later. So you know parole does exist in reality.” This argument was clearly improper. Hawkins v. State, 99 S.W.3d 890, 902 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, pet. ref’d). Having determined the State’s argument was improper, the question under Strickland's first prong is whether counsel's failure to object to the improper argument was deficient conduct. Even where an objection would have been meritorious, the failure to object may be attributed to sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. A substantial risk of failure accompanies a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because the record is simply underdeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the failings of trial counsel. Obviously, the goal of every defense counsel at the punishment phase of trial is to have the jury assess the least amount of punishment possible. This was the goal of defense counsel in the instant case. To achieve this goal, counsel emphasized: (a) appellant’s relative youth -- twenty-three years of age; (b) the decedent’s lifestyle, which involved drinking and illicit drug use; and (c) that the decedent’s death was the result of a fight involving drugs, and not a planned killing. In light of this obvious strategy, we hold there could have been no basis for defense counsel's failure to object to the improper argument of the State. Because the improper argument could only serve to increase appellant’s sentence, defense counsel’s failure to object was “so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Garcia, 57 S.W.3d at 440. For these reasons, we hold the first prong of Strickland has been established. Under the second prong, appellant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Stated another way, the second prong is met if defense counsel's deficient performance creates a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the instant case, the jury assessed the maximum punishment -- 99 years confinement and a fine of $10,000.00. While the decedent’s death was tragic and senseless, as are all murders, we do not find that the circumstances of the instant offense, in light of the decedent’s illicit drug use and unlawful attack on Leo, to be especially heinous. The jury certainly could have believed the crime warranted the maximum sentence. On the other hand, we must accept the probability that the jury accepted the State’s improper invitation to “go back and say, Let’s do him.” Consequently, our confidence in the punishment verdict is undermined by defense counsel's deficient performance. Therefore, we hold the second prong of Strickland has been met. Accordingly, the tenth point of error is sustained. Additionally, we further hold the cumulative effect of the tenth point of error and the deficient conduct in the eighth point of error – failing to object to the erroneous good conduct time instruction – amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase of appellant’s trial. Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). For this additional reason, we sustain the tenth point of error. In light of this conclusion, we need not more fully address the eighth, ninth, and eleventh points of error. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Further, we need not address the remaining points of error: numbers twelve, thirteen and fourteen. See id. The trial court’s judgment of conviction is affirmed. However, because we sustain the tenth point of error, the judgment of the trial court is reversed as it relates to the sentence. This case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of punishment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.29(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
_________________________ CHARLES BAIRD, Justice Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). Opinion delivered and filed this 12th day of August, 2004. | |
Labels: Marshall dissented in Strickland V Washington, Sleeping Attorney strategy, Sleeping soundly, soundly sleeping strategy
Tuesday, March 04, 2008
Therefore, in light of the record before us, which one is that? Who is "us"?"
NUMBER 13-03-00102-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
RICHARD VELA, JR., Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 105th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
OPINION ON REMAND
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Baird (1)
Opinion by Justice Charles F. Baird
On direct appeal, we reversed the judgment of the trial court related to Count III of the indictment, which alleged that appellant had nonconsensual anal intercourse with the complainant, on grounds that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to admit the expert testimony of Cheryl Hartzendorf. Vela v. State, 159 S.W.3d 172, 179 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2004), rev'd, 209 S.W.3d 209 S.W.3d 128, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review and determined that we failed to conduct a proper analysis related to the trial judge's determination of the reliability of Hartzendorf's testimony. Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 135. The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to this court for further proceedings. Id. at 136. We now affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. The Court of Criminal Appeals' Decision.
Trial judges are required to make three separate inquiries before admitting expert testimony: (1) is the witness qualified as an expert by reason of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) is the subject matter of the testimony appropriate for expert testimony; and (3) will admitting the expert testimony assist the fact-finder in deciding the case. Id. at 131. As the court of criminal appeals stated, "[T]hese conditions are commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance." Id. at 131. The court of criminal appeals held that we "muddled the qualification and reliability analyses and, therefore, failed to consider the reliability of Hartzendorf's testimony at all," and that we failed to give proper deference to the trial judge. In that light, we will reconsider our earlier analysis. Id. at 133, 136.
II. The State's Expert Witness.
During its case-in-chief, the State called Sonia Eddleman as an expert witness. Eddleman was the director of the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (S.A.N.E.) Program at Doctor's Regional Medical Center. She had been a registered nurse for eighteen years and was certified as a S.A.N.E. with the Texas Attorney General's office. She had been recognized as an expert and testified many times prior to appellant's trial. Eddleman testified that she examined the complainant and prepared a report that appellant had orally, sexually, and anally assaulted the complainant. Eddleman stated the complainant had a one-and-a-half centimeter "oozing tear" to her anus. The complainant did not exhibit any other genital injuries. However, according to Eddleman this did not indicate that the complainant had not been sexually assaulted because "92 to 95 percent of the time patients that are either consensually sexually active or have been sexually assaulted do not have genital injuries."
III. The Defense's Expert Witness.
To rebut Eddleman's testimony, defense counsel called Cheryl Hartzendorf. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 705(b), the State requested a hearing outside the jury's presence. See Tex. R. Evid. 705(b). At that hearing, Hartzendorf testified she was an R.N. and a Certified Legal Nurse Consultant. Hartzendorf owned an independent legal nurse consulting business and had spent 400 hours at the Medical Legal Nurse Institute in Houston to be a Certified Legal Nurse Consultant. She had participated in twenty-five to thirty cases, both criminal and civil. She had testified three times previously in civil trials and once in a criminal trial alleging sexual assault and involving DNA evidence.
Prior to her testimony, Hartzendorf reviewed the medical records of the complainant from both Corpus Christi Medical Center and Christus Spohn Memorial Medical Center, and the D.P.S. analysis of the swabs and hair combing taken by Eddleman from the complainant. After offering this proof on her qualifications, the following exchange occurred:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And did you note any evidence that was collected in the records for Doctors Regional? I guess what I'm referring to is the S.A.N.E. exam.
HARTZENDORF: Yes, sir. There was evidence collected by the S.A.N.E. nurse, the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner. What was collected were wet mounts for vaginal, anal and oral swabs, head hair combings, vaginal swabs, fingernail swabs, oral smear, vaginal smear and anal smears.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And was, to your knowledge, was there any sperm found?
HARTZENDORF: No. sir, there was none.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now, is it possible that after two days if someone was raped or even if they had just had regular sex, is it possible for sperm to still be here after two days?
HARTZENDORF: Yes, sir.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: It could possibly still be present?
HARTZENDORF: Yes, sir.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. What about the testing under the fingernails, did you get any results from that?
HARTZENDORF: I reviewed the D.P.S. record of the results of the swabs, the fingernail swabs, the vaginal swabs, the hair combing and it did not list any substantive evidence.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I believe that I've qualified her for - for an expert and she has - she is familiar with the case to testify in this trial.
During the State's cross-examination of Hartzendorf the following exchange occurred:
HARTZENDORF: There -There is no evidence to indicate that this particular person, no sperm, no head hair combings, no vaginal swabs, fingernail swabs, oral smears, vaginal smears that - there is no DNA evidence linking this particular - [appellant] to the alleged rape of [the complainant].
THE STATE: So you're saying if there's no DNA evidence, there's no hairs, there's no rape, is that what you're saying?
HARTZENDORF: In this case, yes. I think it was consensual.
THE STATE: I'm saying as a general - I'm saying as a general principle, you're here to testify as an expert to rely on general principles and you're expounding a principle that says that if there's no DNA evidence, no hair evidence, there's no rape, is that what you're going to testify here today to?
HARTZENDORF: In regards to this case, sir?
THE STATE: Yes.
HARTZENDORF: Yes.
THE STATE: What - What factual basis, what literature do you rely on in forming this opinion?
HARTZENDORF: On my general nursing experience, sir.
THE STATE: Have you written any articles regarding your opinions for peer review to expound on this issue?
HARTZENDORF: No, sir.
THE STATE: Okay. Do you think it would be wise to write an article expounding this view so it could be reviewed by peers and so they could review your work?
HARTZENDORF: Wouldn't be a bad idea.
THE STATE: But you have not done that?
HARTZENDORF: No, sir.
THE STATE: And you never testified in regards to this theory before, is that correct?
HARTZENDORF: No, sir.
*****
THE STATE: As far as you know, is there any peer review articles that have been published that expound the view that say if there's no DNA evidence, if there's no physical evidence, then there's no rape?
HARTZENDORF: There could be possibly. I'm not aware of them.
THE STATE: I need to know of one that has been published. Are you aware of one that has been published?
HARTZENDORF: No.
*****
THE STATE: And as far as you know this is not a widely accepted belief among persons in your area to be promoting here today, is that correct?
HARTZENDORF: No.
The State recalled Eddleman to the stand and the following exchange occurred:
THE STATE: [Eddleman], you've heard the testimony form [Hartzendorf] in this particular case?
EDDLEMAN: Yes, sir.
THE STATE: Are you aware of any scientific theory that holds to the principle if there is no DNA evidence, if there is no hair evidence, then there is no rape?
EDDLEMAN: I'm not aware of any.
THE STATE: Okay. Are you aware of any peer review articles that have been published on this scientific theory, expounded by [Hartzendorf]?
EDDLEMAN: No, sir.
THE STATE: Are you aware of anyone else who has proclaimed this particular theory in court?
EDDLEMAN: I have not heard of this theory, no, sir.
THE STATE: Okay. And you are - as a S.A.N.E. nurse, you're required to keep up with all changes and noted documentations and peer review articles, as well?
EDDLEMAN: Absolutely, as well as being peer reviewed myself.
THE STATE: Okay. And to your knowledge, has anyone ever expounded this theory that the Defense is portraying here today?
EDDLEMAN: Not that I'm aware of.
Finally, the following colloquy occurred between the trial judge and defense counsel:
TRIAL JUDGE: But if I understood [Hartzendorf's] testimony correctly, she's here for the purpose of telling this jury her opinion that if there's no DNA evidence, then there's no sexual assault.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, Judge. I asked her about that right now. She -
TRIAL JUDGE: That's what she's -
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right that's what she testified to, but she must have understood it.
TRIAL JUDGE: You didn't ask her any questions about the other examinations that were done by Ms. Eddleman.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, Your Honor. I was just trying to qualify her as an expert.
TRIAL JUDGE: All right. I'm going to sustain the objection.
In light of the above colloquies, we hold the trial judge held Hartzendorf's testimony was not admissible because "her opinion that if there is no DNA evidence then there's no sexual assault," was not reliable. Scientific evidence must meet three criteria to be reliable: (a) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (b) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (c) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question. Id. at 133. In the instant case there was no showing that Hartzendorf's underlying scientific theory was valid. Hartzendorf conceded as much when questioned by the State. This was confirmed by Eddleman. Therefore, in light of the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding Hartzendorf's testimony as an expert witness. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (trial judge's ruling on admissibility of expert testimony reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard). Accordingly, the judgment as to Count III of the indictment is affirmed.
CHARLES F. BAIRD
Justice
Publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Opinion delivered and filed
this the 21st day of February, 2008.
1. Retired Justice Charles F. Baird was assigned to this Court by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas pursuant to the government code. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. º 74.003 (Vernon 2005).
Labels: Baird, Judges, Jusitce, Legalized killers, SCOTUS
an appellate issue is not "ripe for review" until the court of appeals has reached the merits of that issue). An Opinion ~not~ a Fact
NUMBERS 13-00-035-CR & 13-00-042-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
CHARLIE MELVIN PAGE, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 122nd District Court
of Galveston County, Texas.
OPINION ON REMAND
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Baird (1)
Opinion On Remand by Justice Baird
Appellant was charged in separate indictments with the offenses of sexual assault and impersonating a peace officer. The cases were combined into a single trial where a jury convicted appellant of both offenses and assessed punishment at seven years' and five years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, respectively.
On direct appeal, we reversed the judgment on grounds that identity was not an issue in the case, and therefore, evidence of extraneous offenses was inadmissible, but the court of criminal appeals found that identity was at issue in the case, and accordingly, reversed our judgment and remanded the case to this Court. See Page v. State, 88 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002), rev'd, 137 S.W.3d 75, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). On remand, we reversed the judgment of the trial court on grounds that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting extraneous offenses into evidence; however, the court of criminal appeals concluded that the facts of the charged offense and the extraneous offenses showed a pattern of conduct sufficiently distinctive to constitute a "signature," a distinctive and idiosyncratic manner of committing criminal acts, and thereby qualified as an exception to the general rule precluding the admission of extraneous-offense evidence. See Page v. State, 170 S.W.3d 829, 835 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005), rev'd, 213 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). On remand, we affirm.
I. Procedural History
A. Page I and II.
On direct appeal, appellant contended the trial court violated Texas Rules of Evidence Rules 403 and 404(b) in admitting extraneous offense evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 403, 404(b). We addressed only the Rule 404(b) argument, held the trial judge erred in admitting the extraneous offense evidence, and reversed the trial court's judgment. We specifically stated in that opinion: "Having found the trial judge erred in admitting the extraneous evidence testimony of Cavender and Edenfield over appellant's timely Rule 404(b) objection, we do not address appellant's Rule 403 arguments." Page I, 88 S.W.3d at 768 (emphasis supplied). (2) In reversing our decision, the court of criminal appeals addressed only our analysis of appellant's Rule 404(b) argument. Page II, 137 S.W.3d at 79 (". . . Rule 404(b) permits the introduction of extraneous offenses that are relevant to the issue of identity.").
B. Page III and IV.
On remand, we considered only appellant's Rule 404(b) argument and held "the evidence of the Cavender and Edenfield incidents was not admissible under Rule 404(b), and therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence." Page III, 170 S.W.3d at 835. We specifically did not address appellant's Rule 403 arguments. Id. n.5 ("Having determined the extraneous offense evidence was not admissible under Rule 404(b), we need not address appellant's Rule 403 argument.") (emphasis supplied). Despite the fact that we specifically refused to address appellant's Rule 403 argument, the court of criminal appeals in Page IV held: "The admission of the extraneous-offense evidence did not violate Tex. R. Evid. 403 or 404(b)."
II. Appellate Jurisdiction and Hierarchy
As noted above, even though we specifically refused to address appellant's Rule 403 arguments, the court of criminal appeals in Page IV nevertheless held that the admission of the extraneous offense evidence did not violate Rule 403.
We are at a loss as how the court of criminal appeals could render any decision related to Rule 403. For more than seventeen years, that court has recognized that arguments under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 are separate and distinct, requiring specific objections and separate arguments on appeal. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (holding objection under Rule 404(b) was insufficient to invoke Rule 403). And for an even longer period of time, the court of criminal appeals has recognized that its discretionary review jurisdiction is limited to "decisions" made by the court of appeals. Lee v. State, 791 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (explaining that an appellate issue is not "ripe for review" until the court of appeals has reached the merits of that issue).
Despite those longstanding holdings, the court of criminal appeals in Page IV reached the merits of an issue never addressed by this Court. Courts of appeals are intermediate appellate courts and, as such, are "duty bound" to apply the law as interpreted by the court of criminal appeals. Taulung v. State, 979 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, no pet.). Consequently, we cannot disturb the express holding of Page IV that the admission of the extraneous offense evidence did not violate Rule 403, even though we believe that the court of criminal appeals was without jurisdiction to make that holding. See Tex. Const. art. V, ºº 5; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.45 (Vernon 2006); Tex. R. App. P. 66.1.
III. Conclusion
The judgments of the trial court in cause numbers 98CR0911 and 98CR0913 are affirmed.
CHARLES F. BAIRD
Justice
Publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
Opinion On Remand delivered and filed this the
28th day of February, 2008.
1. Former Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Charles F. Baird assigned to this Court by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. º 74.003 (Vernon 2005).
2.
In Page I and III, the Court noted that the author's policy of not referring to complainants by name could not be followed because of the circumstances presented by this case.
Labels: Baird, Judges, Jusitce, Legalized killers, SCOTUS
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
Another baird bites the dust of his own ruling to kingdom Come.........
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Wednesday 26 September 2007
Home / Schiavo Case Resources / Schiavo Timeline
Schiavo Case Resources
Key events in the case of Theresa Marie Schiavo
Kathy Cerminara, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center
Kenneth Goodman, University of Miami Ethics Programs
Acknowledgements and Citation FormatsGet adobe Acrobat
This copyrighted resource is a joint project of the University of Miami Ethics Programs and the Shepard Broad Law Center at Nova Southeastern University. This content may be reproduced for non-commercial, education purposes only, with (i) permission and (ii) appropriate attribution to the source. (For more information, read our copyright policy.) Please send comments, suggestions and corrections to Ken Goodman, UM Ethics Programs, at ethics@miami.edu. News media and others seeking comment from Florida Bioethics Network leaders should call 305-243-5723.
Timeline
December 3, 1963
Theresa (Terri) Marie Schindler is born in Pennsylvania.
November 10, 1984
Terri Schindler, 20, and Michael Schiavo, 21, are married at Our Lady of Good Counsel Church in Southhampton, Pennsylvania. The union is now among the "celebrity marriages" featured at About.com, a Website about marriage.
1986
The couple move to St. Petersburg, where Ms. Schiavo's parents had retired.
February 25, 1990
Ms. Schiavo suffers cardiac arrest, apparently caused by a potassium imbalance and leading to brain damage due to lack of oxygen. She was taken to the Humana Northside Hospital and was later given a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) to provide nutrition and hydration. Police report
May 12, 1990
Ms. Schiavo is discharged from the hospital and taken to the College Park skilled care and rehabilitation facility.
June 18, 1990
Court appoints Michael Schiavo as guardian; Ms. Schiavo’s parents do not object.
June 30, 1990
Ms. Schiavo is transferred to Bayfront Hospital for further rehabilitation efforts.
September 1990
Ms. Schiavo’s family brings her home, but three weeks later they return her to the College Park facility because the family is “overwhelmed by Terri’s care needs.”
November 1990
Michael Schiavo takes Ms. Schiavo to California for experimental “brain stimulator” treatment, an experimental “thalamic stimulator implant” in her brain.
January 1991
The Schiavos return to Florida; Ms. Schiavo is moved to the Mediplex Rehabilitation Center in Brandon where she receives 24-hour care.
July 19, 1991
Ms. Schiavo is transferred to Sable Palms skilled care facility where she receives continuing neurological testing, and regular and aggressive speech/occupational therapy through 1994.
May 1992
Ms. Schiavo’s parents, Robert and Mary Schindler, and Michael Schiavo stop living together.
August 1992
Ms. Schiavo is awarded $250,000 in an out-of-court medical malpractice settlement with one of her physicians.
November 1992
The jury in the medical malpractice trial against another of Ms. Schiavo's physicians awards more than one million dollars. In the end, after attorneys’ fees and other expenses, Michael Schiavo received about $300,000 and about $750,000 was put in a trust fund specifically for Ms. Schiavo’s medical care.
February 14, 1993
Michael Schiavo and the Schindlers have a falling-out over the course of therapy for Ms. Schiavo; Michael Schiavo claims that the Schindlers demand that he share the malpractice money with them.
July 29, 1993
Schindlers attempt to remove Michael Schiavo as Ms. Schiavo’s guardian; the court later dismisses the suit.
March 1, 1994
First guardian ad litem, John H. Pecarek, submits his report. He states that Michael Schiavo has acted appropriately and attentively toward Ms. Schiavo.
May 1998
Michael Schiavo petitions the court to authorize the removal of Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube; the Schindlers oppose, saying that she would want to remain alive. The court appoints Richard Pearse, Esq., to serve as the second guardian ad litem for Ms. Schiavo.
December 20, 1998
The second guardian ad litem, Richard Pearse, Esq., issues his report in which he concludes that Ms. Schiavo is in a persistent vegetative state with no chance of improvement and that Michael Schiavo’s decision-making may be influenced by the potential to inherit the remainder of Ms. Schiavo’s estate.
Pearse GAL Report
January 24, 2000
The trial begins; Pinellas-Pasco County Circuit Court Judge George Greer presides.
Testimony of Father Gerard Murphy
February 11, 2000
Judge Greer rules that Ms. Schiavo would have chosen to have the PEG tube removed, and therefore he orders it removed, which, according to doctors, will cause her death in approximately 7 to 14 days.
Trial Court Ruling
March 2, 2000
The Schindlers file a petition with Judge Greer to allow “swallowing” tests to be performed on Ms. Schiavo to determine if she can consume—or learn to consume—nutrients on her own.
March 7, 2000
Judge Greer denies the Schindlers’ petition to perform “swallowing” tests on Ms. Schiavo.
March 24, 2000
Judge Greer grants Michael Schiavo’s petition to limit visitation to Ms. Schiavo as well as to bar pictures. Judge Greer also stays his order until 30 days beyond the final exhaustion of all appeals by the Schindlers.
Greer Stay and Order Limiting Visitation
January 24, 2001
Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal (2nd DCA) upholds Judge Greer’s ruling that permits the removal of Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube.
In re Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176 (2nd DCA 2001), rehearing denied (Feb. 22, 2001), review denied, 789 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2001). (Case No.: SC01-559)
DCA Ruling
February 22, 2001
The Schindler family’s motion for an Appellate Court rehearing is denied.
March 12, 2001
Michael Schiavo petitions Judge Greer to lift his stay, issued March 24, 2000, in order to permit the removal of Ms. Shiavo’s PEG tube.
March 29, 2001
Judge Greer denies Michael Schiavo’s motion to lift stay issued on March 24, 2000; Michael Schiavo can remove Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube at 1 p.m. on April 20.
Greer Order
April 10, 2001
The 2nd DCA denies the Schindlers’ motion to extend Judge Greer’s stay, which is scheduled to expire April 20, 2001.
DCA Order
April 12, 2001
The Schindlers file a motion requesting that Judge Greer recuse himself.
The Schindlers petition the Florida Supreme Court to stay the removal of Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube.
Motion for Stay Part 1
Motion for Stay Part 2
Court’s Request for Response from Schiavo
April 16, 2001
Judge Greer denies the Schindlers’ motion to recuse himself.
April 18, 2001
The Florida Supreme Court chooses not to review the decision of the 2nd DCA.
In re Schiavo, 789 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 2001). Case No.: SC01-559
Schindler family’s Notice to Appeal to Supreme Court
Schindlers’ Jurisdictional Brief Part 1
Schindlers’ Jurisdictional Brief Part 2
Order Denying Rehearing and Motion for Stay
April 20, 2001
Federal District Court Judge Richard Lazzara grants the Schindlers a stay until April 23, 2001, to exhaust all their possible appeals.
April 23, 2001
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy of the United States Supreme Court refuses to stay the case for a review by that Court.
April 24, 2001
By order of trial court Judge Greer, and upon issuance of a 2nd DCA mandate, Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube is removed
April 26, 2001
The Schindlers file an emergency motion with Judge Greer for relief from judgment based upon new evidence, which includes a claim that a former girlfriend of Michael Schiavo will testify that he lied about Ms. Schiavo’s wishes; Judge Greer dismisses the motion as untimely. Also on this date, the Schindlers file a new civil suit that claims that Michael Schiavo perjured himself when he testified that Ms. Schiavo had stated an aversion to remaining on life support. Pending this new civil trial, Circuit Court Judge Frank Quesada orders Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube to be reinserted.
April 30, 2001
Michael Schiavo files an emergency motion with the 2nd DCA to allow the removal of Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube.
May 9, 2001
The 2nd DCA announces a date for the hearing of oral arguments regarding Michael Schiavo’s motion of April 30, 2001.
June 25, 2001
Arguments in 2nd DCA regarding Michael Schiavo’s motion of April 30, 2001.
July 11, 2001
The 2nd DCA remands the case back to Judge Greer. (1) The 2nd DCA informs the Schindlers that they must address both their desire to have new evidence heard and their perjury claim against Michael Schiavo within the original guardianship proceeding; further, the Schindlers are instructed to file a new motion for relief from judgment in the guardianship proceeding. (2) The 2nd DCA instructs Judge Greer to weigh the Schinders’ new evidence in making a new determination of what Ms. Schiavo would have wanted. (3) The 2nd DCA denies Michael Schiavo’s request to discontinue the PEG tube.
In re Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (2nd DCA 2001).
DCA Order
August 7, 2001
After the 2nd DCA remands the case back to Judge Greer, he again finds that Michael Schiavo may remove Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube on August 28.
August 10, 2001
Judge Greer denies the Schindlers' motion (1) to have their own doctors examine Ms. Schiavo, (2) to remove Michael Schiavo as her guardian, and (3) to disqualify himself from the proceedings.
August 17, 2001
Judge Greer delays the removal of Ms. Schiavo's PEG tube until October 9 in order to allow the Schindlers time to appeal.
October 3, 2001
The 2nd DCA delays the removal of the PEG tube indefinitely.
October 17, 2001
The 2nd DCA rules that 5 doctors should examine Ms. Schiavo to determine if she can improve with new medical treatment. The Schindlers and Michael Schiavo are to choose 2 doctors each, and the court is to appoint a doctor. The appeals court also affirms Greer’s denial of the motion to disqualify himself
In re Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640 (2nd DCA 2001).
DCA Ruling
November 1, 2001
The 2nd DCA denies Michael Schiavo’s motion to rehear the case.
December 14, 2001
Michael Schiavo petitions the Florida Supreme Court to stay the October 17, 2001, ruling of the 2nd DCA. He states that he and the Schindlers will attempt to mediate the dispute in lieu of further litigation.
Michael Schiavo’s Notice of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court
Michael Schiavo’s Motion to Stay DCA’s Ruling.
December 19, 2001
Attorneys meet with a mediator to determine which tests doctors should run on Ms. Schiavo.
January 10, 2002
State Supreme Court stays all legal proceedings pending mediation; it orders attorneys to report on the status of mediation in sixty days.
Supreme Court Order of Stay
February 13, 2002
Mediation between the Schindlers and Michael Schiavo fails.
Notice that Mediation Failed.
March 14, 2002
The Florida Supreme Court denies Michael Schiavo’s petition to review the 2nd DCA’s ruling allowing 5 doctors to examine Ms. Schiavo.
In re Schiavo, 816 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2002) (Table, No. SC01-2678)
2-13-02 Michael Schiavo’s Jurisdictional Petition.
2-13-02 Michael Schiavo’s Petition to Stay ruling of 2nd DCA (10/17/01).
2-22-02 Court’s Order of Stay pending its final decision.
3-01-02 Schindler’s Jurisdictional Brief
3-13-01 Michael Schiavo’s Motion to Strike
3-14-01 Order Denying Schiavo’s Petition
3-14-01 Order to Strike
October 12-22, 2002
The trial court holds a new hearing on new potential medical treatments.
November 15, 2002
The Schindlers contend that Michael Schiavo might have abused Ms. Schiavo and this abuse led to her condition. They ask the court for more time to collect evidence, and to remove Michael Schiavo as guardian.
Petition to remove MS as guardian
November 22, 2002
Judge Greer rules that Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube should be removed January 3, 2003.
In re Schiavo, 2002 WL 31817960 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 2002)(No. 90-2908-GB-003)
Nov22 2002 TC trialctorder11-02.txt
December 13, 2002
Judge Greer stays his November 22 ruling: Ms. Schiavo should not have her PEG tube removed until an appeals court can rule on the case.
December 23, 2002
The 22nd DCA denies a motion Michael Schiavo filed seeking permission to remove the PEG tube.
June 6, 2003
The 22nd DCA, affirming Judge Greer’s November 2002 ruling, concludes that Michael Schiavo can remove Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube on October 15.
In re Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 (2nd DCA 2003) (No. 2D02-5394), rehearing denied (July 9, 2003), review denied 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003).
6-06-03 Court Opinion
July 9, 2003
The 22nd DCA refuses to reconsider its decision.
August 22, 2003
The Florida Supreme Court declines to review the decision.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003) (Table, No. SC03-1242)
7-24-03 Notice of Schindlers Appeal
7-31-03 Michael Schiavo’s Motion to Vacate
Court Order denying Motion to Vacate
8-07-03 Schindler's Petition for a Supreme Court Review
8-13-03 Michael Shiavo’s Response to Petition for Review
8-18-03 Schindlers motion for a Stay
8-19-03 Court Orders Schiavo to make a Respond for the Motion for Stay
8-20-03 Shiavo’s Response to Motion for Stay
8-22-03 Court Order denying Review and Motion for Stay
August 30, 2003
Ms. Schiavo’s parents file a federal lawsuit challenging the removal of Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube. Schiavos’ petition (D). Schindler v. Schiavo, Civil Action No. 8:03-CV-1860-T-26-T-TGW
September 17, 2003
Judge Greer orders the removal of the PEG tube to take place on October 15, 2003. He also rejects the Schindlers’ request that Ms. Schiavo be given therapy to learn how to eat without the tube.
9-17-03 Court Order
October 7, 2003
Governor Jeb Bush files a federal court brief in support of the Schindlers’ effort to stop the removal of the PEG tube.
October 10, 2003
Federal Court Judge Richard Lazzara rules that he lacks the jurisdiction to hear the federal case.
October 14, 2003
The 2nd DCA refuses to block Judge Greer’s order to remove the PEG tube.
October 15, 2003
Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube is once again removed.
October 17, 2003
The Florida Circuit Court in Pinellas County and the First District Court of Appeal refuse to grant a request by "supporters" of the Schindlers to direct Gov. Bush to intervene in the case.
October 19, 2003
The Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc. files a federal court lawsuit that claims that the removal of Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube is abuse and neglect.
Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc. v. Schiavo, No. 8:03-CV-2167-T-23EAJ
October 20, 2003
The Florida House of Representatives passes a bill, “Terri’s Law,” that allows the governor to issue a “one-time stay in certain cases.”
House Bill 35-E
October 21, 2003
The Florida Senate passes the bill; Governor Bush issues an executive order directing reinsertion of the PEG tube and appointing a guardian ad litem for Ms. Schiavo.
Executive Order
Statements by Some House members
Michael Schiavo files a state-court lawsuit arguing that “Terri’s Law” is unconstitutional and seeking an injunction to stop the reinsertion of the PEG tube; the court requests briefs on the Constitutional arguments about “Terri’s Law.”
Schiavo Injunction
Schiavo v. Bush. No. 03-008212-CI-20 (Cir. Ct. Pinellas County, Florida).
The federal court denies the motion for a temporary restraining order filed in the lawsuit of the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc.
Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc. v. Schiavo, 2003 WL 23305833, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 291 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2003).
US District Court Order
Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube is reinserted.
October 22, 2003
David Demeres, Chief Judge for the Pinellas County Circuit Court, orders both the Schindlers and Michael Schiavo to agree within 5 days on an independent guardian ad litem as required under the Governor’s order. (“Terri’s Law” directs: “Upon issuance of the stay, the chief judge of the circuit court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the patient to make recommendations to the Governor and the court.”)
Schiavo's Response
Schindlers' Response
October 28, 2003
President George W. Bush praises the way his brother, Governor Jeb Bush, has handled the Schiavo matter.
Transcript of Rose Garden Press Conference
October 29, 2003
Michael Schiavo files court papers in his state-court lawsuit, arguing that “Terri’s Law” is unconstitutional. The American Civil Liberties Union has joined Michael Schiavo.
Michael Schiavo petitioner brief
October 31, 2003
Judge Demers appoints Dr. Jay Wolfson as Ms. Schiavo’s guardian ad litem. Dr. Wolfson holds both medical and legal degrees; he is also a public health professor at the University of South Florida. He is supposed to represent Ms. Schiavo’s best interest in court, but he has no authority to make decisions for her.
10-31-03 GAL Appointment
November 4, 2003
Governor Jeb Bush asks Circuit Court Judge W. Douglas Baird to dismiss Michael Schiavo’s suit (filed October 21, 2003) that challenges “Terri’s Law.”
November 8, 2003
Judge Baird denies Governor Bush’s motion to dismiss the state-court suit.
November 10, 2003
Governor Bush appeals Judge Baird’s decision; the filing of the appeal has the effect of staying the removal of Ms. Schiavo’s PEG tube.
November 14, 2003
Judge Baird vacates the stay.
11-14-03 Order vacating stay.
November 14, 2003
In response to Judge Baird’s lifting the stay, the 2nd DCA issues an indefinite stay.
November 19, 2003
Governor Bush files a petition to remove Judge Baird.
11-19-03 Petition
November 21, 2003
Florida Sens. Stephen Wise and Jim Sebesta introduce legislation (S692) that would require persons in persistent vegetative states to be administered medically supplied nutrition and hydration in the absence of a living will, regardless of family beliefs about what those patients would have wanted. The measure is withdrawn from consideration on April 16, 2004.
Bill to require sustenence when no living will exists
December 1, 2003
University of South Florida Prof. Jay Wolfson, guardian ad litem, concludes in his report that Ms. Schiavo is in a persistent vegetative state with no chance of improvement.
Wolfson's Report
Governor Bush's response to Wolfson's report
December 10, 2003
The 2nd DCA refuses to remove Judge Baird, who is the presiding judge in the state-court lawsuit filed October 21, 2003.
Bush v. Schiavo, 861 So. 2d 506 (2nd DCA 2003) (No. 2D03-5244)
Court Opinion
January 5, 2004
The Schindler family petitions the Pinellas County Circuit Court to reappoint Jay Wolfson, the guardian ad litem.
1-05-04 Schindlers petition to reappoint GAL
January 8, 2004
Judge Demers rejects the request to reappoint the guardian ad litem, citing the pending court decisions over the constitutionality of “Terri’s Law” as reason to wait on any action.
1-08-04 Order denying reinstatement of GAL
February 13, 2004
The 2nd DCA reverses Judge Baird’s ruling (in the case filed October 21, 2003) that denied the Schindlers permission to intervene in Michael Schiavo’s Constitutional challenge to “Terri’s Law.” The 2nd DCA explains that Judge Baird did not follow proper procedure. The court also gives permission to Governor Bush to question several witnesses who Judge Baird previously had ruled could not offer any relevant testimony.
Bush v. Schiavo, 866 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2004) (on intervention); 866 So. 2d 136 (2nd DCA 2004) (on request to take depositions). (Case No. 2D03-5783).
bushschiavo2 13 04 opn.pdf
2-13-04 Opinion allowing parents to intervene
March 12, 2004
Judge Baird again rejects the Schindlers’ request to intervene in Michael Schiavo’s suit that questions the constitutionality of “Terri’s Law.”
March 20, 2004
Pope John Paul II addresses World Federation of Catholic Medical Associations and Pontifical Academy for Life Congress on "Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas." His remarks spark widespread interest and controversy.
Pope's address
March 29, 2004
Nursing home workers discover 4 “fresh puncture wounds” on one arm and a fifth wound on the other arm; the workers state that a hypodermic needle appears to have caused the wounds. Attendants discovered the wounds shortly after the Schindlers visited Ms. Schiavo for 45 minutes. Toxicology reports indicate that no substance was injected into Ms. Schiavo. Clearwater police later conclude that the marks might have been made by a device used to move Ms. Schiavo and, in any case, that no evidence of abuse or other wrongdoing could be found.
St. Petersburg Timesreport (May 15, 2004)
March 29, 2004
Judge Greer denies a motion filed by the Schindlers seeking to have Michael Schiavo defend himself in a hearing; they allege that he is violating a 1996 court order that requires him to share a sufficient amount of Ms. Schiavo’s medical information. Michael Schiavo claims that he has shared an adequate amount of information through attorneys.
April 16, 2004
S692 is withdrawn from consideration in the Florida Legislature.
S692 History
April 23, 2004
The 2nd DCA rules that the Pinellas County trial court has jurisdiction to hear and is the proper venue for the case Michael Schiavo has filed against Governor Bush asserting that "Terri's Law" is unconstitutional.
2nd DCA Jurisdictional Ruling
May 6, 2004
Pinellas Circuit Judge W. Douglas Baird rules that "Terri's Law," sought and signed by Gov. Bush and approved by the Legislature on October 21, 2003, is unconstitutional. The governor appeals the ruling.
Judge Baird's order
June 1, 2004
The 2nd DCA grants a motion from attorneys for Michael Schiavo to send the case directly to the Florida Supreme Court and bypass a lower-court review. Meanwhile, attorneys for Gov. Bush file a motion asking that all appeals be halted until the issue of whether Michael Schiavo has the authority to fight the governor on his wife's behalf is resolved.
June 16, 2004
Florida's Supreme Court, pointing to "a question of great public importance requiring immediate resolution by this Court," accepts jurisdiction and sets oral arguments for August 31, 2004.
Florida Supreme Court order
June 30, 2004
2nd DCA affirms Judge Baird's March 12 ruling denying the Schindlers the ability to intervene in the lawsuit over the constitutionality of "Terri's Law."
July 19, 2004
The Schindlers file a motion in the Circuit Court for Pinellas County seeking relief from judgment in Schindler v. Schiavo. Based in part upon the recent statement by Pope John Paul II, they argue that the orders mandating withdrawal of the PEG tube from Ms. Schiavo and authorizing Michael to challenge the constitutionality of "Terri's Law" violate her "free exercise of her religious beliefs [and] her right to enjoy and defend her own life and, in fact, imperil her immortal soul."
Relief from judgment motion
Appendix to motion(seven exhibits)
July 27, 2004
National group of bioethicists files amicus brief "in support of Michael Schiavo as guardian of the person."
Bioethicists' amicus brief
August 31, 2004
The Florida Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the lawsuit over the constitutionality of "Terri's Law."
Streaming video of the proceedings, archived by WFSU at Florida State University
Transcript
St. Petersburg Times report
August 31, 2004
Circuit Judge George Greer, opposed for re-election by an attorney who was known to oppose Greer's rulings in the Schiavo case, is re-elected by a large margin.
St. Petersburg Times report
September 23, 2004
Florida's Supreme Court, unanimously affirming the trial court order, declares "Terri's Law" unconstitutional.
Supreme Court ruling
October 4, 2004
Governor Bush files a motion and then an amended motion for rehearing and clarification of the Florida Supreme Court opinion issued on September 23, 2004
Amended motion for rehearing and clarification
October 21, 2004
Florida Supreme Court denies Governor Bush's amended motion for rehearing and clarification, as well as a motion seeking permission to file a second amended motion for rehearing and clarification. The Court issues a mandate to transfer jurisdiction back to Judge Greer.
Order Denying Motion
October 22, 2004
In Pinellas County, at the trial-court level, Judge Greer denies the motion filed by the Schindlers on July 19, 2004. He also stays the removal of her PEG tube until December 6, 2004.
Order Denying Motion
Order Granting Stay
October 25, 2004
Governor Bush files a motion with the Florida Supreme Court asking that it recall the mandate it issued on October 22 because he will be filing a petition for certiorari regarding this case with the United States Supreme Court.
Motion to Recall Mandate
Appendix to Motion
October 27, 2004
Florida Supreme Court grants Governor Bush's motion asking that it recall the mandate issued on October 22. Proceedings in the trial and all appellate courts in the case of Bush v. Schiavo are stayed until November 29, 2004.
Order Recalling Mandate
November 22, 2004
In the guardianship proceeding in Pinellas County, the Schindlers appeal from Judge Greer’s October 22 order denying their motion for relief from judgment.
Brief Seeking Review
December 1, 2004
Governor Bush files a petition for certiorari, seeking review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision regarding "Terri’s Law," with the U.S. Supreme Court.
U.S. Supreme Court Docket
December 29, 2004
2nd DCA, without opinion, denies the Schindlers' November 22 appeal from Judge Greer's order refusing to reopen the guardianship proceeding.
January 10, 2005
The Schindlers again ask Judge Greer to remove Michael Schiavo from his judicial appointed post of Ms. Schiavo’s guardian.
January 13, 2005
The Schindlers file two motions – one in the 2d DCA, asking it to reconsider its decision of December 29, 2004, and a second in the trial court guardianship proceeding, asking Judge Greer once again to prevent withdrawal of nutrition and hydration until the 2d DCA does so.
January 24, 2005
The United States Supreme Court refused to grant review of the case in which the Florida Supreme Court struck down “Terri’s Law” as unconstitutional.
February 7, 2005
Florida's Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services cites the Terri Schindler-Schiavo Foundation for failing to register with the state to solicit donations.
February 11, 2005
In Pinellas County, Judge Greer denies the Schindlers' motions, filed January 10 and 13, 2005. The order authorizing withdrawal of the PEG tube remains in effect, although implementation is stayed pending the outcome of currently pending appeals.
February 15, 2005
The Schindlers ask the 2nd DCA to stay the mandate issued when it refused to hear their most recent appeal.
February 16, 2005
Randall Terry, founder of the pro-life activist organization Operation Rescue, appears with the Schindlers at a news conference, vowing protest vigils against removal of the PEG tube.
February 18, 2005
The Schindlers again petition Judge Greer in Pinellas County for reconsideration of the order of February 11, 2005, in which the court upheld its judgment, made in the year 2000, that the PEG tube should be removed.
February 18, 2005
Florida Representatives Baxley Brown; Cannon; Davis, D.; Flores; Goldstein; Lopez-Cantera; Murzin; Quinones; Traviesa introduced H 701 in the Florida Legislature. H 701, mirroring S. 692 (introduced in October 2003 and withdrawn in April 2004), would require maintenance of medically supplied nutrition and hydration in incapacitated persons in most instances.
H.701
February 21, 2005
The 2d DCA denies the Schindlers’ motion of February 15, 2005, clearing the way for removal of the PEG tube when the current stay expires on February 22, 2005. Judge Greer schedules a hearing on the Schindlers’ motion of February 18, 2005, for February 23, 2005.
February 22, 2005
Judge Greer stays removal of the PEG tube until 5 p.m. on February 23, 2005 (after he hears argument on the motion filed by the Schindlers on February 18, 2005).
February 23, 2005
After a hearing, Judge Greer extends the stay preventing removal of the PEG tube until 5 p.m. on February 25, 2005, to permit time to issue an order detailing his decisions regarding matters discussed at the hearing. Officials from Florida’s Department of Children and Families (DCF) move to intervene in the case, but Judge Greer denies the motion to intervene at the hearing.
DCF Motion to Intervene
February 25, 2005
Judge Greer denies the motion before him and orders that, “absent a stay from the appellate courts, the guardian, Michael Schiavo, shall cause the removal of nutrition and hydration from the ward, Theresa Schiavo, at 1 p.m. on Friday, March 18, 2005.”
Order Denying Stay
February 26, 2005
The St. Petersburg Times reports that a Vatican cardinal spoke on Vatican Radio opposing removal of the PEG tube.
St. Petersburg Times article
February 28, 2005
The Schindlers file a number of motions with Judge Greer, addressing a range of issues. They also indicate that they will appeal the judge's decision of February 25, 2005. Judge Greer denies some of the motions but agreed to set a hearing date to consider others.
St. Petersburg Times article
March 7, 2005
The Schindlers appeal Judge Greer's February 25, 2005 order to the 2nd DCA.
Bioethicists from six Florida universities submit an analysis of H701.
Bioethicists' Analysis
Legal Analysis
March 8, 2005
U.S. Rep. David Weldon (R.-Fla.) introduces in the United States House of Representatives H.R. 1151, titled the Incapactitated Persons' Legal Protection Act. The bill would permit a federal court to review the Schiavo matter through a habeas corpus lawsuit.
H.R. 1151
March 9, 2005
The Florida House Health Care Regulation Committee considers H.701, voting to approve a Council/Committee Substitute 701 instead of the original version.
Council/Committee Substitute 701
March 10, 2005
Judge Greer issues order denying Florida's Department of Children and Families the right to intervene in the guardianship case.
March 14, 2005
The Judiciary Committee in the Florida House considers H.701, voting to approve another Committee substitute for the original bill. The South Florida Sun-Sentinel reports that the House and the Senate have agreed that this bill will come to a vote.
Second Committee Substitute 701
March 15, 2005
The Florida House Health & Families Council considers and approves the second committee substitute H.701.
The Florida Senate Judiciary Committee passes S.804, providing that medically supplied nutrition and hydration cannot be “suspended from” a person in a PVS if: (1) the purpose of the suspension is “solely to end the life of” a person in a PVS; (2) a conflict exists on the issue of suspension of medically supplied nutrition and hydration among the persons who could be proxy decisionmakers for that person under Florida law; and (3) the person in the PVS had not executed a written advance directive or deignated a health care surrogate.
Senate Bill 804
March 16, 2005
The 2d DCA affirms Judge Greer’s orders and refuses to stay the scheduled March 18 withdrawal of the PEG tube.
2d DCA Opinion
The U.S. House of Representatives, by voice vote, passes H.R. 1332, the Protection of Incapacitated Persons Act of 2005. This bill would amend federal law to provide for removal of certain cases to federal court from state court, rather than authorizing use of the federal habeas corpus remedy to obtain federal court review, as H.R. 1151 would have.
H.R. 1332
Rep. Joseph R. Pitts (R-Pa.) comments (on March 17) on H.R. 1332.
Text of Statement, from Congressional Record
March 17, 2005
The Florida House of Representatives approves H.701, after some amendments.
House-Engrossed H.701
The Florida Senate votes down S.804.
History of S.804
Florida’s Department of Children and Families (DCF) petitions the Florida Supreme Court for relief, and the Florida Supreme Court denies the petition.
DCF All Writs Petition
Florida Supreme Court order
The U.S. Senate passes a “private bill” applying to the Schiavo case but differing from H.R. 1332. The U.S. Senate website, at www.senate.gov, explains a “private bill” as follows: “A private bill provides benefits to specified individuals (including corporate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through private legislation when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted. Many private bills deal with immigration–granting citizenship or permanent residency. Private bills may also be introduced for individuals who have claims again the government, veterans benefits claims, claims for military decorations, or taxation problems. The title of a private bill usually begins with the phrase, "For the relief of. . . ." If a private bill is passed in identical form by both houses of Congress and is signed by the President, it becomes a private law.”
U.S. Senate Bill 653 ES
Orlando Sentinel article
The Schindlers ask the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case, but the U.S. Supreme Court denies their petition.
Schindlers’ Petition to U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Supreme Court Denial
Republican senators circulate a memo on the political advantages of supporting legislation to reinsert Ms. Schiavo's nutrition tube. On April 7, The Washington Post reported that "The legal counsel to Sen. Mel Martinez (R-Fla.) admitted [on April 6] that he was the author of a memo citing the political advantage to Republicans of intervening in the case ... Brian H. Darling, 39, a former lobbyist for the Alexander Strategy Group on gun rights and other issues, offered his resignation and it was immediately accepted, Martinez said."
The Republican Memo
The Washington Post report
March 18, 2005
The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform issues five subpoenas: one commanding Michael Schiavo to appear before it and bring with him the “hydration and nutrition equipment” in working order; three commanding physicians and other personnel at the hospice to do the same; and one commanding Ms. Schiavo to appear before it. The subpoenas would require that the PEG tube remain in working order until at least the date of testimony, March 25, 2005. The subpoenas are included as appendices to the U.S. House All Writs Petition (see just below).
The Committee on Government Reform also moves to intervene in the guardianship litigation before Judge Greer and asks Judge Greer to stay his order requiring removal of the PEG tube. Judge Greer denies the motions.
U.S. House Motion to Intervene
U.S. House Motion for Stay
The Committee on Government Reform files an emergency all-writs petition with the Florida Supreme Court, effectively seeking reversal of Judge Greer’s denial of its motions. The Florida Supreme Court denies this petition.
U.S. House All Writs Petition
The House Committee on Government Reform asks the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Florida Supreme Court’s denial of its petition. Justice Kennedy, acting for the Court, denies the application for relief.
U.S. Supreme Court Docket, Case No. SC05-449
The PEG tube is removed in mid-afternoon. This is the third time the tube has been removed in accordance with court orders.
The Schindlers, as “next friends” of their daughter, file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court in the Middle District of Florida. That court dismisses the case for lack of jurisdiction and refuses to issue a temporary restraining order because “there is not a substantial likelihood that [the Schindlers] will prevail on their federal constitutional claims.”
Schindlers' Habeas Corpus Petition
March 19-20, 2005
The U.S. Senate delays its Easter recess and works on Saturday to reach a compromise with the House on a bill, S.686, closely resembling the special bill it passed on March 17. On Palm Sunday (which holiday is frequently noted in debate), it then passes S.686 and the U.S. House of Representatives returns from Easter recess for a special session to debate S.686.
U.S. Senate Compromise Bill S.686
March 20, 2005
House Democrats and Republicans hold news conferences.
March 21, 2005
Shortly past 12:30 a.m., the U.S. House of Representatives votes 203-58 to suspend its rules and pass S.686.
Congressional Debate on S.686
Roll call vote on S.686
President Bush signs S.686 at 1:11 a.m.
Federal District Court Judge James D. Whittemore, Middle District of Florida (in Tampa), hears arguments on the Schindlers' motion that he order re-insertion of the PEG tube while the lawsuit they will assert pursuant to S.686 is litigated.
Schindlers' Complaint
Response to Motion for Injunction
Government's Statement of Interest
March 22, 2005
Federal District Court Judge Whittemore refuses to order re-insertion of the PEG tube.
Federal Court Order
The Schindlers appeal Judge Whittemore’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Schindlers’ 11th Circuit Appeal
Schindlers' Appeal Exhibits
Michael Schiavo’s Response
Government’s Statement of Interest
The Schindlers file an amended complaint in the federal district court, adding a number of new claims.
Schindlers'
Amended Complaint
A look at Capitol Hill politics in Schiavo case.
NPR "Morning Edition" broadcast
March 23, 2005
The U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 vote, denies the Schindlers' appeal.
11th Circuit Opinion
United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, acting en banc (as a whole), refuses to rehear the Schindlers’ appeal, leaving intact the court’s ruling earlier in the day.
En Banc Rehearing Denial
House Democrats and Republicans hold news conferences.
The Florida Senate, by a vote of 21-18, again refuses to pass S.804. This bill was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 15, 2005.
Senate Bill 804
History of S.804
Florida Governor Jeb Bush reports that a neurologist, Dr. William Cheshire, claims that Ms. Schiavo is not in a persistent vegetative state. The governor asks the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) to obtain custody of Ms. Schiavo in light of allegations of abuse. Judge Greer holds a hearing on the matter.
DCF Motion to Intervene
Dr. Cheshire's Affidavit
The Schindlers file a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
Schindlers’ Supreme Court Petition
Respondents’ Brief
Judge Greer issues a restraining order prohibiting DCF from removing Ms.Schiavo from the hospice or otherwise re-inserting the PEG tube.
The Schindlers ask again for a restraining order in federal court.
Second Motion for Restraining Order
Memorandum in Support of Motion
Five members of the U.S. House of Representatives ask the U.S. Supreme Court to file a “friend of the court” brief.
U.S. Supreme Court Docket, Case No. 04A825
March 24, 2005
The U.S. Supreme Court refuses to hear the Schindlers’ case.
U.S. Supreme Court Order
The Schindlers file a Second Amended Complaint, adding several claims, in the federal court case. Count X, titled “Right to Life,” alleges a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to life because removing the PEG tube is “contrary to [Ms. Schiavo’s] wish to live.”
Second Amended Complaint
The trial court (Judge Whittemore) schedules a hearing for 6 p.m. and orders supplemental briefs on Count X.
Whittemore Order
Judge Greer denies DCF’s motion to intervene. DCF appeals Judge Greer’s order. Judge Greer vacates the automatic stay upon appeal. The 2d District Court of Appeal refuses to reinstate the stay. The Florida Supreme Court dismisses a motion on this matter because it “fails to invoke” the court’s jurisdiction.
DCF Motion in Florida Supreme Court (describing events)
Exhibits to Motion
Florida Supreme Court Order
March 25, 2005
Judge Whittemore denies the Schindlers’ second motion for an order re-inserting the PEG tube.
District Court 2d TRO Order
The Schindlers appeal Judge Whittemore’s order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit affirms. The Schindlers announce that they will pursue no more federal appeals.
Schindlers’ Brief
Responsive Brief
Second Eleventh Circuit Opinion
The Schindlers file an emergency motion attempting to convince Judge Greer to reinsert the PEG, at least temporarily until the Eleventh Circuit decides their appeal. The motion contends her family heard her try to verbalize "I want to live," according to news reports. (This motion and accompanying affidavits comprise Appendix 7 of the Schindlers’ Petition linked under March 26, just below.)
DCF appeals Judge Greer's March 23 denial of its first motion to intervene to the 2d DCA.
DCF Appeal
March 26, 2005
Judge Greer denies the Schindlers' motion of March 25, 2005.
Judge Greer's Order
The Schindlers appeal to the Florida Supreme Court to reverse Judge Greer's refusal to reinsert the PEG tube, but the Florida Supreme Court refuses to do so, citing a lack of jurisdiction.
Schindlers' Petition
Florida Supreme Court Order
News agencies report the arrest on March 25 of Richard Alan Meywes of Fairview, N.C., for offering $250,000 for the killing of Michael Schiavo and another $50,000 for the death of Judge Greer.
CNN Report
The Schindlers advise supporters demonstrating around the hospice to return home to spend the Easter holiday with their families. The protesters remain.
March 27, 2005
In an interview on CNN, Governor Bush says: "I cannot violate a court order. I don't have power from the U.S. Constitution, or the Florida Constitution for that matter, that would allow me to intervene after a decision has been made."
CNN Report
March 29, 2005
The Rev. Jesse Jackson leads a prayer service outside the hospice and speaks out against removal of the PEG tube.
The 2d DCA upholds Judge Greer's ruling refusing to let the DCF intervene.
Despite earlier indications that they would pursue no further federal appeals, the Schindlers petition the entire Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for permission to file a motion for rehearing en banc although the time to do so has expired. A grant of that petition would enable the Schindlers to ask for review of the Eleventh Circuit decision of March 24.
March 30, 2005
The Eleventh Circuit permits the Schindlers' filing and then, acting both through a panel and as a whole, denies the motion for rehearing.Panel Order
Order of Entire Eleventh Circuit
The U.S. Supreme Court refuses to review the Eleventh Circuit ruling.
U.S. Supreme Court Docket
March 31, 2005
Ms. Schiavo dies at 9:05 a.m. Her body is transported to the Pinellas Country Coroners’ Office for an autopsy.
Hospice of the Florida Suncoast issues a statement.
Text of Statement
Florida Gov. Bush issues a statement.
Text of Statement
Judge Greer authorizes Michael Schiavo to administer Ms. Schiavo's estate.
Greer Order
On this date in 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that coma patient Karen Ann Quinlan could be disconnected from her respirator. She remained in a persistent vegetative state and died in 1985.
April 12, 2005
The Wall Street Journal Online/ Harris Interactive Health Care Poll finds that "most people disapprove of how President Bush, Governor Bush, and the Congress handled the issue." Harris Poll
April 15, 2005
In response to a motion from the media, Judge Greer orders DCF to release redacted copies of abuse reports regarding Ms. Schiavo. Newspapers report that DCF found no evidence of abuse after investigating the 89 reports filed before February 18, 2005. Thirty allegations are outstanding and still being investigated, but Judge Greer earlier had ruled that those allegations duplicated those previously filed.
Order and Reports
* Part I
* Part II
* Part III
May 17, 2005
More than six weeks after Ms. Schiavo's death, Lisa Wilson is the last of the hundreds of protesters outside Ms. Schiavo's hospice.St. Petersburg Times ( Report)
June 15, 2005
Dr. Jon Thogmartin, Florida's District Six Medical Examiner, releases the results of Ms. Schiavo's autopsy. He reports that the autopsy showed Ms. Schiavo's condition was "consistent" with a person in a persistent vegetative state. "This damage was irreversible," he said. "No amount of therapy or treatment would have regenerated the massive loss of neurons." No evidence of abuse was found, he said.
Autopsy Report and Supporting Documents
June 17, 2005
Florida Governor Jeb Bush asks a state prosecutor to investigate the circumstances of Ms. Schiavo's 1990 cardiac arrest, specifically the amount of time that elapsed between the time Ms. Schiavo collapsed and Michael Schiavo called 911.
June 20, 2005
Despite earlier statements that he intended to bury Ms. Schiavo's remains in Pennsylvania, Michael Schiavo buries them in Clearwater, Florida. The grave marker reads:
Schiavo
Theresa Marie
Beloved Wife
Born December 3, 1963
Departed This Earth
February 25, 1990
At Peace March 31, 2005
I Kept My Promise
Photo of Grave Marker; and AP Report
June 22, 2005
News organizations report that Randall Terry, leader of a pro-life group that demonstrated against removal of Ms. Schiavo's PEG tube, intends to run for Florida State Senate. In that race, he would challenge Sen. James E. King, Jr., who helped block the Florida Legislature's final efforts to force reinsertion of the PEG tube.
June 27, 2005
Prosecutors find no evidence of wrongdoing by Michael Schiavo after Ms. Schiavo's collapse in 1990. They write: "If the available facts are analyzed without preconceptions, it is clear that there is no basis for further investigation. While some questions may remain following the autopsy, the likelihood of finding evidence that criminal acts were responsible for her collapse is not one of them....We strongly recommend that the inquiry be closed and no further action be taken."
Memo from Prosecutors to State Attorney
Memo from State Attorney to Bush
July 7, 2005
Gov. Bush agrees to drop any further investigation into why Ms. Schiavo collapsed in 1990.
Bush Letter to State Attorney
July 8, 2005
According to The Associated Press, "The fledgling Ave Maria University [in Naples, Florida] has established a scholarship in the name of Terri Schiavo for students planning careers in the priesthood."
August 10, 2005
The New York Times reports that Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), referred to Ms. Schiavo's case during a pre-confirmation-hearing meeting with President Bush's U.S. Supreme Court nominee, Judge John Roberts. Senator Wyden reportedly asked Judge Roberts whether he believed Congress should have taken the action it took. Although Judge Roberts reportedly refused to discuss the Schiavo case specifically, Senator Wyden recounts the judge's reply to a more general question as follows: "I am concerned with judicial independence. Congress can prescribe standards but when Congress starts to act like a court and prescribe particular remedies in particular cases, Congress has overstepped its bounds."
Times Report (archive access payment required)
August 11, 2005
The New York Times reports that the White House disagrees with Senator Wyden's account. "Ed Gillespie, the chief White House lobbyist for Judge Roberts's Senate confirmation, sent a letter . . . saying that the notes taken by a White House aide during the seesion reflected a different response: 'I am aware of court precedents which say Congress can overstep when it prescribes particular outcomes in particular cases.' " Senator Wyden stands by his earlier statement.
Times Report(archive access payment required)
August 16, 2005
A conservative Catholic group wants 18 academics purged from campus for perpetuating "a culture of death" by backing abortion rights or siding against Terry Schiavo's parents, The Associated Press reports.
October 18, 2005
A state judicial nominating commission announces that the lawyer who headed the DCF efforts to intervene in the Schiavo case is a finalist for two new state judgeships.
Orlando Sentinel Report (payment required)
December 7, 2005
Michael Schiavo establishes a political action committee — TerriPAC — to support or oppose politicians based on their positions regarding "government intrusion" in private lives.
TerriPAC Website
Tampa Tribune (Report)
January 21, 2006
Michael Schiavo marries his long-time girlfriend in a private ceremony in a church in Safety Harbor, some 15 miles northwest of Tampa.
St. Petersburg Times (Report)
Last updated 21-Aug-2006
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Labels: Baird, Judges, Jusitce, Killing by starvation, Legalized killers
